Bureaucratisation and the growth of health care expenditures in Europe by Albrecht, Johan et al.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FACULTEIT ECONOMIE 
EN BEDRIJFSKUNDE 
 
 
HOVENIERSBERG 24 
B-9000 GENT 
Tel. : 32 -  (0)9 – 264.34.61 
Fax. : 32 -  (0)9 – 264.35.92 
 
 
 
WORKING PAPER 
 
 
 
Bureaucratisation and the growth of health care 
expenditures in Europe 
 
Johan Albrecht 1 
Mattias Neyt 2 
Tom Verbeke 3  
 
 
 
October 2005 
 
2005/335 
 
 
                                                          
1 author for correspondence:   Ghent University, Faculty of Economics and Business 
Administration, Hoveniersberg 24, 9000 Gent, Belgium. E-mail: johan.Albrecht@ugent.be - 
Tel ;++32(0)9/2643510 – Fax ;++32(0)9/2643599 
2 Ghent University, Faculty of Economics and Business Administration (mattias.neyt@ugent.be)  
3 Ghent University, Faculty of Economics and Business Administration 
(tom.verbeke@ugent.be) 
     D/2005/7012/53 
 1
Bureaucratisation and the growth of health care expenditures in Europe  
 
Johan Albrecht∗, Mattias Neyt and Tom Verbeke 
Ghent University, Belgium 
 
Abstract 
The public choice literature suggests that bureaucrats might join forces with specific 
pressure and industrial groups which advocate an expansion of health care activities. 
As a result, the ongoing process of bureaucratisation can be a driving force behind the 
overproduction of health care services. In addition, Michel Foucault was the first to 
depict medicalisation and normalisation as processes part of a broader institutional 
infrastructure set up to control individuals. Both processes require a strong 
bureaucracy, established by the ruling elites. For our empirical analysis, the share of 
government employment in total employment has been used as a proxy for 
bureaucracy. Our results show that the process of bureaucratisation has a very 
significant and positive influence on national health care expenditures per capita in 20 
European countries. Together with the evolution of per capita income, we can 
conclude that the ongoing bureaucratisation is one of the driving forces behind the 
rise of health care expenditures in Europe. A similar conclusion holds for the research 
intensity of the country. However, the combination of a high level of 
bureaucratisation and a high research intensity results in lowering per capita health 
expenditures. Our results furthermore confirm that the ageing of the population is 
consistently not significant once bureaucratisation is included in the analysis. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Controlling the growth of health care expenditures is a political priority in most 
developed countries. Especially in the countries with the highest health care 
expenditures as a share of GDP1, proposals for fundamental reforms of the health care 
system have been high on the budgetary agenda in the last two decades (Hacker, 
2004). Cost containment attempts are needed because of the growing capacity of 
medicine and the enormous expansion of offered health care services (Braithwaite, 
1997). Although a few countries managed to reduce the relative share of health care 
expenditures as a share of GDP between 1980 and 2000 – in Sweden and Denmark 
the relative share of health care expenditures has been reduced by respectively 4.5% 
and 8.8% (Hacker, 2004) –, recent figures clearly suggest upward trends. In OECD-
countries, the annual growth rate of health care expenditures between 1997 and 2002 
was 4.3%, a dramatic increase compared to the 2.5% growth rate between 1992 and 
1997 (OECD, 2004). There is not a single explanation for the growing importance of 
health care services in our modern society. Cross-country differences in health care 
expenditures have been studied by many authors, with an emphasis on structural and 
technical determinants. Essential structural determinants are the income level and 
institutional characteristics of health care systems, while the ageing of the society, 
higher life expectancies and the increasing costs of new pharmaceuticals and medical 
technologies are frequently used technical determinants. In micro-economic models at 
the national level, wage evolutions for different categories of medical personnel are 
also included. 
Although economic factors are of essential importance and dominate the 
debate on health policy reforms, the rise of the ‘health project’ incorporates much 
more than new equilibriums between supply and demand conditions. Beck and Beck-
Gernsheim (2002) refer to the modern concept of health as a guiding value of the 
individualized society. They distinguish two driving forces behind the rise of the 
‘health project’. In the course of secularisation, health became a secular expectation of 
salvation. What can no longer be expected from an afterlife – freedom from cares, 
illness and suffering – is projected to life on earth. Furthermore, they stress the 
essential human condition to perform and produce in our individualised market 
                                                          
1 In 2004, health care expenditures in the US amounted to 14.6% of GDP. Switzerland and Germany 
did spend respectively 11.2% and 10.9% of their GDP on health care (OECD, 2004). 
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society. From this perspective, the development of a public health care system ensures 
the appropriate quality or health status of the human resources in the economic system 
and is presented as a compensation for the suffering of the labouring population. 
Illich (1976) argues that people in highly industrialized societies are 
conditioned just to receive goods and services instead of providing themselves even 
basic services. Self-care then becomes a disappearing attribute. This attitude created 
dependant consumers for whom an expansion of health care services can only be seen 
as highly desirable. Similar arguments have been developed by Kleinman (1980) with 
his typology of three health care sectors: the popular, the professional and the folk 
sector. Kleinman (1980) suggests that between 70 and 90% of illnesses are managed 
within the popular sector. Lay people only activate their professional and non-
specialist health care by deciding to consult an outsider. In our consumer-culture, 
popular self-care practises are gradually replaced by a growing monopoly of 
professional health care providers. Apparently, our modern culture attaches high value 
on external opinions and control mechanisms. 
But there are other, more endogenous factors involved in medicalisation of 
society. The latter concept can be defined as the ongoing tendency of public problems 
to be defined as medical problems (e.g. the medical perspective on the quality of the 
labour population). Scientific progress can impact existing boundaries and societal 
needs. Melzer and Zimmern (2002) argue that over time, the diagnostic and treatment 
boundaries have expanded to include people with milder manifestations of pathology 
and lower levels of risk in the ‘disease’ category. A new process of premature 
medicalisation seems to emerge with genetic tests for markers that may not result in 
symptoms for half a century or more (Melzer and Zimmern, 2002). 
Since cultural attitudes and values towards the ‘health project’ clearly interact 
with supply and demand conditions, this paper aims to introduce into the analysis of 
health care expenditures several aspects of public choice theorizing concerning 
bureaucratisation and its consequences. In addition, we want to highlight the link 
between medicalisation and societal control mechanisms. 
 
2. Bureaucratisation and the supply-centred coalition 
 
The health care bureaucracy is growing with rising health care expenditures, but can 
the ongoing process of bureaucratisation trigger increasing health care expenditures? 
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The Niskanen (1971) model concludes that the discretionary and monopoly powers of 
bureaucrats lead to suboptimal health care overproduction in order to maximise the 
utility of bureaucrats. An overexpansion of the size of the public sector can also be 
explained by industrial and professional pressure group activities, especially when 
vote maximising politicians can ‘buy off’ demands by different societal groups 
(Buchanan and Tullock, 1962). Both perspectives suggest that the emergence of a 
coalition of bureaucrats and pressure groups is hardly avoidable. However, the utility 
of bureaucrats will not continue to increase linearly with larger budgets because of 
coordination costs and growing uncertainty with respect to future power balances 
among (new) departments. Furthermore, control rather than expansion can be the 
dominating goal of bureaucrats. From the resource dependence perspective (Pfeffer 
and Salancik, 1978), bureaucracies need resources to continue functioning. Health 
care cost containment efforts create uncertainties and therefore bureaucrats might join 
forces with specific pressure and industrial groups which advocate an expansion in the 
bureaucrat’s activities. Given the specialised information available to bureaucrats, 
they make valuable allies for pressure groups (Jackson, 1982). The increase of 
screening campaigns is illustrative for this evolution. Health care bureaucrats and the 
suppliers of health care services stress increased levels of efficiency as a response to 
cost containment proposals by politicians. Increasing inpatient throughput becomes a 
target for hospitals that want to increase their level of efficiency. Hence, more patients 
need to be found and mass screening of the population can result in higher inflows. 
This interpretation of improved cost-effectiveness ratios – lower costs per patients to 
realize a specific level of effectiveness– is strongly criticized by authors stressing that 
not cost-effectiveness ratios but outcomes of medical interventions and the 
distribution of services based on needs are essential characteristics of a high quality 
public health care system (Braithwaite, 1997). However, the efficiency answer to cost 
containment efforts is supported by the medical profession because it does not 
preclude an absolute health care budget growth.  
The medical profession constitutes a special interest group. Peterson (2001) 
explains how the medical profession could obtain a monopoly over its work and 
became over time so strong that it could preserve two core domains of autonomy: 
economic (the size and circumstances of physicians’ incomes) and clinical (control 
over the nature of medical practice and treatment decisions). It is very likely that 
bureaucrats and the medical profession will form a coalition to reconcile increasing 
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cost concerns with their own interests. Furthermore, since medical professionals 
define illness, they can influence the demand for specific medical treatments and 
hence safeguard their own interests but also those of the related bureaucrats. In their 
analysis of the health care and welfare market, Illich (1976) and Achterhuis (1981) 
were among the first to confirm the validity of Say’s Law with numerous examples of 
how the supply of health care services creates its own demand. With the arrival of 
genetic information, the future market opportunities for new categories of 
interventions and pharmaceuticals appear unbounded. The exploration of these 
opportunities requires enormous investments and hence the awareness of the social 
importance of the new research directions. Private industry therefore needs support 
from policymakers in terms of R&D-funding and market creation. By entering the 
enormous health care market, private industry enforces the existing supply-centred 
coalition of the medical profession and health care bureaucrats. This is an economic 
process that made it possible to create immeasurable health benefits for humanity in 
the recent decades. Some very critical authors however question recent new trends in 
the coalition of big pharma and big government. Moynikan, Heath and Henry (2002) 
even argue that some forms of ‘medicalisation of the society’ may now be better 
described as ‘disease mongering’ to expand markets for new products. They state 
rather straightforward that ‘there’s a lot of money to be made from telling healthy 
people they’re sick (Moynikan, Heath and Henry, 2002).’ Their overview of 
inappropriate medicalisation, the marketing of fear and related communication 
strategies to shape medical opinion2 – to establish a need for a new drug and create 
the desire among prescribers –, concludes that the medicalisation of human distress 
seems to have no limits. Although this rather extreme view can partly reflect reality, 
we should also be aware of the changing attitude of patients; several groups of 
patients (or their families) put enormous pressures on doctors to proceed with 
whatever possible treatment. 
This broad coalition of bureaucrats, industrial pressure groups and medical 
professionals is not counterbalanced by vote maximising politicians when public 
opinion endorses the ‘more is better’ credo with respect to the provision of health 
                                                          
2 ‘One in twenty Belgians suffers from obsessive-compulsive disorders (De Zondag, 2005)’ was a 
leading article in De Zondag, a free newspaper distributed in Flemish bakeries on Sundays. The author 
mentions that only 16% of the patients receives some type of treatment. An obligatory section in 
articles like this learns the reader to recognise the problem or disease.  
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care. Bureaucrats know however that there are limits to health care expenditures as 
they are aware of the budgetary confinements within which they operate. Hence, they 
have to choose among the available medical technologies. This is especially the case 
as new medical technologies often do not replace ‘old’ technologies but allow more 
illnesses and people to be treated. These new technologies are therefore unlikely to be 
cost-saving (McGuire and Serra, 2005). From the point of view of the bureaucracy, 
this implies that they have to make a choice among the technologies that become 
available. One can assume that a powerful bureaucracy will be able to make better 
informed, rational choices and choose, among all available technologies, the ones that 
are the most efficient. The latter assumption will be tested by the empirical model in 
section 4. 
 
3. Control and responsibility 
 
The formation of a coalition of winners from an expanded health care system is still 
an incomplete explanation for the rise of the ‘health project’. A crucial question 
relates to why and how people become patients. This transformation from healthy 
individual to patient is related to the medicalisation of society or the tendency of 
public problems to be defined as medical. By defining people who behave strange as 
‘sick’, their status in society is changed and they become patients in the hands of 
professionals who will decide on appropriate treatments. Michel Foucault was the first 
to depict medicalisation as a process part of a broader institutional infrastructure set 
up to control individuals and to prescribe normalised behavior (Zwart, 1995). In 
Surveiller et punir, Foucault (1975) observes a panoptical3 power in modern societies 
– biopower or la biopolitique –, that seek to control every single aspect of human life 
including the human body and soul. The resulting control mechanisms invaded our 
society and deny the identity-constructing ability of individuals. Humans experience 
the need to assume passive attitudes and become consumers, not producers. For 
Foucault, the modern welfare state pursues the utopian goal of organising people’s 
life based on technocratic rationalities and the consent of normalized populations. In 
his writing, he stresses the close interconnectedness of control institutions, scientific 
                                                          
3 In 1791, Jeremy Bentham introduced the panopticum in his writings. The panopticum is an 
architectural principle to control large groups of people by a minimal number of guards (Foucault, 
1975). 
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developments and new technologies (Foucault, 1975). Our high-tech society enables 
unseen control and regulatory interventions that start before birth and now even 
already include the option of euthanasia in a few countries. 
The ultimate phase of exertion of panoptical power is a situation of self-
mastery in which humans start to control themselves. As such, they have internalized 
formerly external control systems. People suffer from the imposed control 
mechanisms but the rationalities of control and societal efficiency render opposition 
into unreasonable and unacceptable behaviour. With his theories on the normalisation 
of the population, Foucault suggests that power structures serve a twofold goal: they 
aim at maximizing the size and the adaptability of a healthy and hence productive 
labour force, and secondly prevent uncontrollable opposition against ruling elites 
(Achterhuis, 1981). This process of normalisation requires a strong bureaucracy, set 
up by the power elites. Apparently, the first goal has been realised. Beck and Beck-
Gernsheim (2002) explain the rise of preventive care as an element of self-
management imposed on modern individuals. Our society increasingly expects from 
people to act responsible with respect to one’s own health. Beck and Beck-Gernsheim 
(2002) attach the terms ‘voluntary compulsion’ or ‘preventive compulsion’ to the 
requirements of societies in which claims on community resources in case of illness 
will be matched by the obligation to be healthy. As predicted by Heidegger in 1938, 
new technologies lead to compulsory self-management of the individual health and 
hence turns the individual into an economic resource, this time not mobilized for war 
purposes but for industrial-economic purposes (Heidegger, 1977). In the next section 
we elaborate an empirical model to assess the impact of processes of bureaucratisation 
and control on the evolution of public health care expenditures. 
 
4. Empirical analysis 
 
4.1 Data and hypotheses 
Our empirical model tries to assess the impact of the bureaucratisation as an 
explanation for the differences in per capita health care expenditures between 20 
European countries for the period 1980 to 2000. As dependent variable, we used the 
log of the average public health care expenditures per capita (which we will denote 
with ‘Hecap’), at 1995 prices and adjusted for purchasing power parities (PPP). The 
data were averaged over periods of five years, i.e. 1980-1984, 1985-1989, 1990-1994 
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and 1995-1999. We used 5-year averages as our focus is on structural relationships 
between variables. It allows us to isolate the analysis from short-run influences. 
Furthermore, annual changes in some of our independent variables are extremely 
limited. Based on data availability, 20 European countries were included in our 
analysis: Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, 
Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, 
Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and United Kingdom. 
In the preceding paragraphs, we introduced bureaucratisation and external as 
well as internal control factors in our modern society. Although bureaucratisation and 
control factors play a different theoretical role in explaining the evolution of the 
health project, they are closely intertwined as discussed in section 3. 
Bureaucratisation (‘Bur’) can be measured by the relative size of government or the 
scope of public policies. An alternative would be to assess the regulatory burden in 
different countries. However, limited data availability on the number of laws and 
regulation and their impact necessitated us to focus on the human resources of the 
bureaucracy. We measure bureaucratisation as the share of government employment 
in total employment. Since bureaucracies have been created to control modern 
societies and to guarantee stability (Jackson, 1982), we can measure bureaucratisation 
as well as control mechanisms in society by the relative share of government 
employment in total employment. A growing bureaucracy implies strategic behaviour 
to ensure the needed financial resources. Therefore, an ongoing expansion of 
activities in a coalition with various pressure groups is the best insurance against 
future reductions in the size of the bureaucracy. Our assumption with respect to the 
interaction with pressure groups is rather simplistic; more bureaucrats will make more 
coalitions likely for the simple reason that in highly regulated societies, bureaucrats 
have the monopoly to create new markets. At the same time, every bureaucrat is 
controlling a specific activity or condition of modern society. Hence, more 
bureaucrats enable a wider scope of controlling activities. There are of course many 
other sources of control in modern societies but these are not the essence of public 
policy. Furthermore, existing control mechanisms such as in marriages, religious, 
cultural and educational institutions do not disappear once governments regulate other 
aspects of daily life. As both functions of bureaucrats are impossible to distinguish, 
we opted to work with the share of government employment in total employment as 
the variable that captures the propensity of bureaucracies to support supply-centred 
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health coalitions as well as the imposition of control mechanisms on society. 
Vaccination campaigns are illustrative for the capacity of health bureaucrats to create 
new markets and control the health status of the population. For our empirical 
analysis, government employment was calculated based on ILO’s (International 
Labour Office) employment statistics. We worked with 5-year averages and total 
government employment is the sum of the ISIC-3 categories L (Public administration 
and defence; compulsory social security), M (Education), N (Health and social work) 
and O (Other community, social and personal service activities)4. Hence, government 
employment data include all jobs that are publicly financed. As the N category 
includes health-related jobs as well as jobs in the social sector, a growth of health-
related public jobs will directly impact expenditures. Since we measure 
bureaucratisation as the share of government employment in total employment,  an 
increase in health-related jobs only leads to an increased bureaucratisation when 
private job creation is lower than total public job creation. The relationship between 
health-care jobs in the independent variable bureaucratisation and health care 
expenditures as dependent variable is therefore not an linear one. The share of 
category N in total government employment varies strongly among countries. For 
2000, this share was 7.9% for Austria, 11.6% for Belgium, 6.1% for the Czech 
Republic, 17.4% for Denmark5, 14.3% for Finland etc. However, these percentages 
also include the important category of ‘social work’6. Annual government 
employment or bureaucratisation data are presented in figure I for a selection of 
countries. 
Figure I shows that there are enormous differences for the subset of selected 
countries. For most countries, we observe an increase of the bureaucratisation – 
measured as government employment in total employment – between 1980 and 2000. 
However, once a high level of bureaucratisation is reached – close to 35% – further 
                                                          
4 On-line source: http://laborsta.ilo.org/ 
5 Statistics Denmark provides series of employment in ‘human health activities’. Between 1994 and 
2000, employment in this category remained more or less stable (from 8 417 to 8432 jobs) while the 
share of government employment in total employment increased from 33.58% to 35.05% 
6 With the introduction of ISIC-3 specific data for category N are available for all countries. Before the 
introduction of ISIC-3,  only aggregated government employment data can be used (L+M+N+O). 
Unfortunately, only a few countries implemented ISIC-3 before 1990 (Ireland in 1986, Sweden in 
1987, the UK in 1988, Finland in 1989). Most other countries followed in the mid-1990s or later 
(Austria in 1994, Belgium in 2001, Germany in 1995, the Netherlands in 1995, Norway in 1996 etc). 
As a result, excluding category N from total employment data would create for each country at a 
different moment in time a significant downward shift in the series (in Ireland in 1986 but in Norway in 
1996). To avoid this disturbance, we opted to include category N in our analysis. 
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growth becomes difficult. We observe a stabilization of the bureaucratisation in 
Sweden, Denmark, Belgium and Norway for the period 1995-2000. A similar 
stabilization but at a much lower level is found in Luxembourg, Spain, Austria and 
Ireland. 
 
Figure I: Evolution of bureaucratisation in selected European countries 
Source: based on ILO employment statistics (http://laborsta.ilo.org) 
 
In our empirical work, two specific hypotheses with respect to 
bureaucratisation are tested. First of all, we want to know whether a higher degree of 
bureaucratisation resulted in higher per capita health expenditures. Furthermore, since 
administrators decide on the use of new technologies in health care, we can expect 
that their expertise should make it possible to select the most efficient and effective 
technologies and treatments. A strong bureaucracy should have the competences to 
select the most relevant health and other R&D priorities, to assess outcomes of R&D 
and to allocate the new technologies in order to create social benefits. Reliable data on 
the production or use of new medical products and technologies are not available for 
our sample of countries so we needed to use the number of researchers per thousand 
employees (‘Res’ in table I) as a proxy variable. We assume that in countries that 
strongly invest in technological innovation, a fast diffusion of new technologies is 
relatively easy. As research output in health care is ‘slow’ to reach the market, we 
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lagged this variable with five years. To test for the latter hypothesis on the selection of 
technologies, the interaction between bureaucratisation and the production of new 
technologies is explicitly integrated into the model (Bur x Res in table II). 
The literature on health care expenditures suggests several other explanatory 
variables. First of all, a measure of health outcomes should be included. Health output 
can be measured by life expectancy (‘Lifeexp’ in table I) (Coory, 2004; Schieber, 
1993). For this variable, 5-year averages were taken. In the popular debate, 
policymakers often claim that growing public health care expenditures are the result 
of the ageing of the population. This variable (‘Pop65’ in table I) was measured as the 
share of the population older than 65 year in total population (Barros, 1998; Roberts, 
1999; Seshamani, 2004). This variable was also averaged over the same 5-year 
periods. Furthermore, PPP-adjusted income per capita (‘GDPcap’ in table I) was also 
included as an explanatory variable (Gerdtham, 2000, 2001; OECD, 2002; Roberts, 
1999) and the log of the 5-year averages was taken. We used World Development 
Indicators by the World Bank (2002) for the data on public health care expenditures, 
population, life expectancy, numbers of researchers and per capita income. As noted 
by McGuire and Serra (2005) health care expenditures are likely driven by the 
availability and use of new technologies. Our proxy ‘Res’ will be used to control for 
the impact of new technologies on health care expenditures. Table I provides the 
mean and standard deviation of these variables. 
 
Table I: mean and standard deviation of our variables 
a: mean 
b: standard deviation 
 
Finally, dummies were used to reflect institutional characteristics of national 
health care systems. The OECD characterizes national health systems in three 
categories: public reimbursement, public contract and public integrated. Under the 
public reimbursement system, providers receive retrospective payments for services 
supplied. A reimbursement system is often coupled to a fee-for-service payment 
arrangement and can be found in systems with multiple private and public insurers 
 LogHecap Bur Res(-5) Lifeexp Pop65 LogGDPcap 
85-89 6.754a 
(0.474)b 
0.244 
(0.057) 
3.171 
(1.222) 
74.759 
(2.030) 
13.597 
(1.822) 
9.481 
(0.346) 
90-94 6.932 
(0.465) 
0.263 
(0.053) 
3.774 
(1.382) 
75.547 
(2.297) 
14.323 
(1.645) 
9.688 
(0.367) 
95-99 7.041 
(0.436) 
0.279 
(0.056) 
4.580 
(1.645) 
76.559 
(2.177) 
14.875 
(1.608) 
9.880 
(0.361) 
 12
and multiple suppliers. The public contract system aims at a higher degree of control 
over total funding and its distribution. This is obtained by agreements between third-
party payers and health care providers. In integrated systems, one single agency 
controls both the funding and the provision of (public) health services (Gerdtham, 
2001). Two dummies reflect the type of health system: public reimbursement 
(DumPR: Belgium, France, Luxembourg and Switzerland) and integrated system 
(DumINT: Denmark, Finland, Greece (from 1983), Hungary (up to 1994), Ireland, 
Italy, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Spain (from1984), Sweden and United Kingdom. 
The remaining countries (Austria, Czech Republic, Germany, Greece (up to 1982), 
Hungary (from 1995), the Netherlands and Spain (up to1983)) were classified as the 
baseline system, i.e. public contract (Barros, 1998; Gerdtham, 2001).7 
A second institutional characteristic is whether or not the physicians/general 
practitioners act as gatekeepers in the health care system. With gatekeepers, the 
patient has to see the gatekeeping physician/general practitioner before gaining access 
to more specialised medical care. The following countries were classified as 
gatekeeping (DumGK): Austria, Denmark, Germany, Hungary (From 1993), Ireland, 
Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Spain, and United Kingdom. In the 
remaining countries no gatekeeping is considered (Belgium, Czech Republic, Finland, 
France, Greece, Hungary (up to 1992), Luxembourg, Sweden and Switzerland) 
(Barros, 1998; footnote 5). If one of the institutional health system characteristics 
changed during the five year periods, the value of the dummy in the first year of that 
period was taken into account. 
Finally, three from our 20 OECD countries could be entitled as economies in 
transition, i.e. Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland. These countries have made 
reforms to make a transition from a planned to a market economy. A dummy 
(DumEIT) was included for this specific characteristic. 
 
4.2 Equations 
Three equations were set up for respectively the time periods 1985-1989, 1990-1994 
and 1995-1999. 
 
                                                          
7 The country classifications for the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland were based on the following 
sources: Czech Republic: World Health Organization, 1996; Hungary: Gaal, 2004; Poland: European 
Observatory on Health Care Systems, 1999. 
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Hecap Bur Bur Res Res
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β β β β β ε
= + × + × × + × + × +
= + × + × × + × + × +
X
X
( )95-99 0 1 i, 95-99 2 i, 95-99 i, 90-94 3 i, 90-94 x i, 95-99 i, 95-99Bur Bur Res Resβ β β β β ε= + × + × × + × + × +X
 
 
In these equations a subscript i indexes the countries in our sample, X contains the 
other explanatory variables (such as Lifeexp, Pop65 and GDPcap) as well as DumPR, 
DumINT, DumGK and DumEIT. ei is the error term. As mentioned before, data were 
available for all countries during the period 1980-2000. Due to the lagged influence of 
our research variable, only three equations could be set up. The complete set of 
parameters of the equations were estimated simultaneously in a system. The 
parameters were estimated as a linear panel data model (Wooldridge, 2002). We have 
not used fixed effect panel as our dummy variables can not be estimated with country-
specific fixed effects. A cross equation coefficient restriction was imposed by using 
the same coefficients in the three equations. Unfortunately, the limited amount of 
observations does not allow us to estimate various equations per period as we do not 
have sufficient degrees of freedom. 
 
5. Results 
 
Our results are presented in table II. In general, the fit of our equations is very good. 
Especially for the second equation (1990-1994), the explanatory power (adjusted R2) 
of the models is excellent and the Jarque Bera-statistic suggests that residuals are 
normally distributed for each of the 3 equations. Before addressing the impact of 
bureaucratisation, it is useful to consider first the results in the columns (1) and (2) of 
table II, which mimic models previously estimated in the health care literature. The 
results clearly indicate that our data do not yield results that differ substantially from 
the ones obtained in literature. Both estimates show, as expected, that the average 
income level and research intensity have a positive and significant impact on per 
capita health care expenditures. Furthermore, the estimates on the average income 
level suggest that the income elasticity of public health care expenditures equals 1 
(Barros, 1998). GDP per capita seems to be the most important single explanatory 
factor (Barros, 1998; OECD, 2002; Reinhardt, 2002). A higher life expectancy 
resulted in lower per capita health expenditures (significant at respectively 5 and 1%). 
In other words, a healthier population is an indication for lower per capita health care 
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expenditures. The share of the population over 65 has a positive impact on per capita 
health care expenditures only when the institutional dummies are included (model 
(2)). The inclusion of the institutional dummies also leads to a constant term with a 
positive sign. 
 
Table II: Estimation results 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Constant 
 
-1.721** 
(-2.598) 
1.820* 
(1.704) 
-2.838***
(-4.096) 
0.605 
(0.550) 
-1.284 
(-1.151) 
-2.342*** 
(-3.164) 
Bur 
 
  3.832*** 
(3.376) 
3.540*** 
(3.517) 
3.775*** 
(3.368) 
3.611*** 
(3.396) 
Bur x Res   -0.709***
(-2.679) 
-0.602** 
(-2.606) 
-0.708***
(-2.740) 
-0.596** 
(-2.358) 
Res 
 
0.056*** 
(3.628) 
0.068*** 
(4.523) 
0.221*** 
(3.029) 
0.201*** 
(3.023) 
0.231*** 
(3.200) 
0.179** 
(2.520) 
Lifeexp 
 
-0.030** 
(-2.518) 
-0.050***
(-3.716) 
-0.013 
(-0.972) 
-0.033** 
(-2.312) 
-0.025* 
(-1.691) 
-0.012 
(-0.897) 
Pop65 
 
0.019 
(1.478) 
0.032** 
(2.537) 
0.013 
(0.945) 
0.022 
(1.651) 
0.012 
(0.881) 
0.020 
(1.451) 
GDPcap 
 
1.077*** 
(12.542) 
0.858*** 
(9.553) 
0.972*** 
(10.074) 
0.783*** 
(7.865) 
0.913*** 
(9.078) 
0.922*** 
(9.381) 
DumPR  -0.053 
(-0.700) 
 -0.058 
(-0.817) 
 -0.017 
(-0.255) 
DumINT 
 
 -0.163***
(-3.277) 
 -0.147***
(-3.205) 
 -0.093** 
(-2.197) 
DumGK 
 
 -0.042 
(-0.882) 
 -0.078* 
(-1.781) 
 -0.066 
(-1.569) 
DumEIT  -0.286***
(-3.006) 
 -0.272***
(-2.994) 
-0.156 
(-1.647) 
 
Adj. R²       
1985-1989 
 
0.805 0.779 0.844 0.827 0.836 0.839 
Adj. R²       
1990-1994 
 
0.939 0.907 0.955 0.936 0.941 0.950 
Adj. R²       
1995-1999 
 
0.853 0.884 0.824 0.852 0.812 0.828 
a: coefficient 
b: t-statistic 
*** Significant on 1% level 
** Significant on 5% level 
* Significant on 10% level 
 
Starting with column (3), the results of the more complete models with 
bureaucratisation and the institutional dummies are presented. To check the 
robustness of our results for various institutional settings, we estimated various 
equations with and without the institutional dummies and the dummy for economies 
in transition. 
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We find that the process of bureaucratisation has a very significant (1%) and 
positive influence on national health care expenditures per capita. Together with the 
evolution of per capita income, the ongoing bureaucratisation is one of the driving 
forces behind the rise of health care expenditures in Europe. A similar conclusion 
holds for the research intensity of the country. However, the combination of a high 
level of bureaucratisation and a high research intensity lowers per capita health 
expenditures. Precisely a strong bureaucracy implies the ability to make rational use 
of technological innovations. We find a negative coefficient for this interaction term 
(significant at 1%-level, except at 5% in column (6)). The inclusion of the interaction 
term – with a negative coefficient- increases the coefficient of the research variable in 
columns (3)-(6) when compared to the first two columns. The results in column (3)-
(6) for the bureaucratization index, research intensity and the interaction term are very 
robust for the institutional setting. This suggests that the impact of these variables on 
public health care expenditures is comparable across various institutional health care 
systems. Also for models (3), (5) and (6), the Wald coefficient test does not allow us 
to reject the hypothesis that the income elasticity of public health care expenditures 
differs from 1 at a 1% significance level. 
Without the institutional dummies, the impact of both life expectancy and the 
share of the population older than 65 is not significant (column (3) and (5)). Life 
expectancy is only significant at the 5%-level in the model of column (4) when all the 
dummies are included. However, the ageing of the population is consistently not 
significant once bureaucratisation is included in the analysis. In contrast to popular 
opinion, ageing is not at all a driving force behind the rise of public health care 
expenditures per capita. This finding is in line with previous results (Barros, 1998; 
OECD, 2002). Apparently, per capita health care expenditures seem to depend on the 
remaining lifetime of the individual, i.e. the terminal phase of life is very expensive, 
independently of whether this phase starts at age 60 or 90. An increase in the older 
than 65 share in the population seems to shift the bulk of expenditures to higher age 
categories, leaving expenditures per capita more or less unchanged (Zweifel, 1999). 
As mentioned by Coory (2004), projections from models even show that an increase 
in expenditure due to population ageing would be small and manageable (see also 
McGuire and Serra, 2005). 
We find that of the three health care system dummies, only the dummy for 
integrated systems has a highly significant and negative impact on per capita health 
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care expenditures in Europe (at the 1%-level in (2) and (4)). The two other health care 
system dummies also have a negative coefficient but are not significant. Compared to 
the system of public contract, an integrated system is almost 15% cheaper if we 
consider the results in column (4) of table II.  It should be noted that the findings of 
previous studies on the influence of type of health system are not consistent. Barros 
(1998) and Gerdtham (1998) found that countries with a public reimbursement system 
were able to have a lower fraction of GDP devoted to health care expenditures. For 
the first study, this was only significant if level equations were used instead of growth 
rate equations. In contrast, an OECD study found that a public reimbursement system 
was more expensive when comparing with public contract or integrated systems 
(OECD, 1992). These differences may be due to the selection of countries and time 
periods. Our results with respect to gatekeeper systems are similar to the results of 
Barros (1998), i.e. they have no explanatory power of health care expenditures. 
The dummy for the economies in transition is highly significant when added to 
the health care system dummies ((2) and (4)). Model (5) shows that without the health 
system dummies, the economies in transition dummy is not significant. Not 
surprisingly, economies in transition have significantly lower health care 
expenditures. 
To test the economic significance of our results, we estimate what would 
happen in the presence of a 1 standard deviation shock to an explanatory variable. 
Assume for instance that the level of bureaucratization increases with 1 standard 
deviation. Based on our 95-99 data, from table I it can be seen that this means that the 
level of bureaucratization increases with 0.056. Compared with the average level of 
bureaucracy, a rise with 0.056 represents a 20% increase. Using our estimates in 
column (4) of table II, this means that the log of the hecap increases with 0.198 
(=3.540*0.056), which respresents a 21.9% increase in per capita health care 
expenditures. However, evaluated at the cross section average level of research 
intensity (4.58 per thousand inhabitants), this increase in bureaucracy means that it is 
better equipped to deal with technology. This reduces the impact of a 1 standard 
deviation increase in the level of bureaucracy with 14.3% (= exp(-0.602*0.056*4.58)-
1) on per capita heath care expenditures. Hence, the net effect of a 1 standard 
deviation increase of bur on hecap equals 7.6%. Likewise, a 1 standard deviation 
increase in research intensity increase per capita health care expenditures with 39.2%. 
However, as the bureaucracy now has a wider set of available options to choose from 
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this has a negative impact on expenditures. Evaluated at the average level of 
bureaucratization (27,90%) a 1 standard deviation increase in research intensity, 
through its impact on the available technologies, reduces per capita health care 
expenditures with 24,1% (= exp(-0.602*1.645*0.2790)-1). Hence, the net effect of a 1 
standard deviation increase of research intensity on per capita health care 
expenditures equals 15%. Table III presents the results of this exercise for all 
variables in column (4) of table II. 
 
Table III: impact of changing variables with one standard deviation 
 St.dev. Coefficient Impact on 
loghecap 
% impact 
on hecap 
Bureaucratization 
 0.056 3.540 0.198 21.896 
Interaction 
Bureaucratization and 
Research intensity 
0.945 -0.602 -0.570 -43.447 
Research intensity 
 1.645 0.201 0.331 39.236 
Life expectancy 
 2.177 -0.033 -0.071 -6.854 
Population 65+ 
 1.608 0.022 0.035 3.562 
GDP/capita 
 0.361 0.783 0.283 32.711 
 
6. Conclusions 
 
The rise of the ‘health project’ should be explained by assessing multiple driving 
forces. Cultural attitudes and values towards the ‘health project’ clearly interact with 
supply and demand conditions and we therefore introduced several aspects of public 
choice theorizing into the analysis of health care expenditures. The focus of our 
analysis deals with the bureaucratisation of society and its consequences. Our 
approach is motivated by two intertwined processes. First of all, the classic Niskanen 
(1971) suggests a suboptimal health care overproduction in order to maximise the 
utility of bureaucrats. The overexpansion of the size of the public sector can however 
also be explained by industrial and professional pressure group activities, especially 
when vote maximising politicians can ‘buy off’ demands by different societal groups. 
Hence, the emergence of a coalition of bureaucrats and pressure groups is hardly 
avoidable. Health care cost containment efforts create uncertainties and therefore 
bureaucrats might join forces with specific pressure and industrial groups which 
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advocate an expansion in the bureau’s activities. Given the specialised information 
available to bureaucrats, they make valuable allies for pressure groups (Jackson, 
1982). As a result, the ongoing process of bureaucratisation can be a driving force 
behind the overproduction of health care services. Secondly, our society appear to 
develop and diffuse more encompassing control mechanisms. Michel Foucault was 
the first to depict medicalisation and normalisation as processes part of a broader 
institutional infrastructure set up to control individuals and to prescribe normalised 
behaviour. This process of normalisation requires a strong bureaucracy, established by 
the ruling elites. For our empirical analysis, the share of government employment in 
total employment has been used as a proxy for bureaucracy. Our results show that the 
process of bureaucratisation has a very significant (at the 1%-level) and positive 
influence on national health care expenditures per capita. Together with the evolution 
of per capita income, we can conclude that the ongoing bureaucratisation is one of the 
driving forces behind the rise of health care expenditures in Europe. A similar 
conclusion holds for the research intensity of the country. However, the combination 
of a high level of bureaucratisation and a high research intensity results in lowering 
per capita health expenditures. Precisely a strong bureaucracy implies the ability to 
make rational use of technological innovations. Our results furthermore confirm that 
the ageing of the population is consistently not significant once bureaucratisation is 
included in the analysis. In contrast to popular opinion, ageing is not at all a driving 
force behind the rise of public health care expenditures per capita. 
 
 19
References 
 
Achterhuis, H. (1981). De markt van welzijn en geluk (Ambo, Baarn) 
 
Barros, P.P. (1998). The black box of health care expenditure growth determinants. Health Economics, 
Vol. 7, 533-544 
 
Beck, U. and Beck-Gernsheim, E. (2002). Individualization (SAGE Pulications, London) 
 
Braithwaite, J. (1997). Competition, productivity and the cult of ‘more is good’ in the Australian health 
care sector. Australian Journal of Public Administration 56(1), 37-44 
 
Buchanan, J. and Tullock, G. (1962). The calculus of consent: logical foundations of constitutional 
democracy (University of Michigan Press, Michigan) 
 
Coory, M.D. (2004). Ageing and healthcare costs in Australia: a case of policy-based evidence? 
Medical Journal of Australia, Vol.180, 581-583 
 
De Zondag (2005). Eén op twintig lijdt aan dwanggedachten (29/05/2005) 
 
European Observatory on Health Care Systems (1999). Health care systems in transition: Poland. 58p 
 
Foucault, M. (1975). Surveiller et punir. Naissance de la prison (Gallimard, Paris) 
 
Gaal, P. (2004). Health care systems in transition: Hungary. Copenhagen, WHO Regional Office for 
Europe on behalf of the European Observatory on Health Systems and Policies, 152p 
 
Gerdtham, U.G., Jönsson, B., MacFarlan, M., Oxley, H. (1998). The determinants of health 
expenditure in the OECD countries: a pooled data analysis. Developments in Health Economics and 
Public Policy, Vol.6, 113-134 
 
Gerdtham, U.G, Löthgren, M. (2001). Health system effects on cost efficiency in the OECD countries. 
Applied Economics, Vol. 33, 643-647 
 
Gerdtham, U.G, Jönsson, B. International comparisons of health expenditure: theory, data, and 
econometric analysis. In handbook of health economics, Vol. 1A, ed. Culyer, A.J. and Newhouse, J.P. 
(New York: Elsevier, 2000), 11-53 
 
Hacker, J. (2004). Reform without change, change without reform, in Levin, M. and Shapiro, M. (Eds). 
Transatlantic policymaking in an age of austerity: diversity and drift (Georgetown University Press, 
Washington)  
 
Heidegger, M. (1977). Die Zeit des Weltbildes, in: Martin Heidegger Gesamtausgabe. Bd. 5: Holzwege 
(Klostermann, Frankfurt) 
 
Illich, I. (1976). Limits to medicine: medical nemesis, the expropriation of health (Marion Boyars, 
London) 
 
Jackson, P.M. (1982). The political economy of bureaucracy (Philip Allan, Oxford) 
 
Kleinman, A. (1980). Patients and healers in the context of culture (University of California Press, 
Berkeley) 
 
McGuire, A. and Serra, V. (2005). The cost of care. Is there an optimal level of expenditure? 
International Health Vol. 27(1)  
 
Melzer, D. and Zimmern, R. (2002). Genetics and medicalisation. British Medical Journal, Vol.324, 
863-864  
 
 20
Moynikan, R., Heath, I. and Henry, D. (2002). Selling sickness: the pharmaceutical industry and 
disease mongering. British Medical Journal, Vol.324, 886-891 
 
Niskanen, W. (1971). Bureaucracy and representative government (Aldine, Chicago) 
 
OECD (1992). The reform of health care: comparative analysis of seven OECD countries. Health 
Policy Studies No. 2, Paris 
 
OECD (2002). Biotechnology and healthy ageing: policy implications of new research. Paris, 169p 
 
OECD (2004). Health Data 2004, 1st edition 
 
Peterson, M. (2001). From trust to political power: interest groups, public choice, and health care. 
Journal of Health Politics, Policy and Law 26(5), 1145-1163 
 
Pfeffer, J. and Salancik, G. (1978). The external control of organisation: a resource dependence 
perspective ( Harper and Row, New York) 
 
Reinhardt, U.E., Hussey, P.S., Anderson, G.F. (2002). Cross-national comparisons of health systems 
using OECD data, 1999. Health Affairs, Vol. 21, 169-181 
 
Roberts, J. (1999). Sensitivity of elasticity estimates for OECD health care spending: analysis of a 
dynamic heterogeneous data field. Health Economics, Vol. 8, 459-472 
 
Schieber, G.J., Poullier, J.P., Greenwald, L.M. (1993). Health spending, delivery, and outcomes in 
OECD countries. Health Affairs, Summer,120-129 
 
Seshamani, M., Gray, A.M. (2004). A longitudinal study of the effects of age and time to death on 
hospital costs. Journal of Health Economics, Vol.23, 217-235 
 
Wooldridge JM. (2002). Econometric analysis of cross section and panel data. Cambridge, The MIT 
Press, 752p. 
 
World Bank (2002). World Development Indicators on CD-ROM (World Bank, Washington) 
 
World Health Organization (1996). Health care systems in transition: the Czech Republic. Copenhagen, 
37p 
 
Zweifel, P., Felder, S., Meiers, M. (1999). Ageing of population and health care expenditure: a red 
herring? Health Economics, Vol. 8, 485-496 
 
   FACULTEIT ECONOMIE EN BEDRIJFSKUNDE 
   HOVENIERSBERG 24 
   9000 GENT Tel. : 32 -  (0)9 – 264.34.61  
 Fax. : 32 -  (0)9 – 264.35.92  
 
 
 WORKING PAPER SERIES              14 
 
 
04/259 D. VANDAELE, P. GEMMEL, Development of a measurement scale for business-to-business service quality: 
assessment in the facility services sector, September 2004, 30 p.  
 
04/260 F. HEYLEN, L. POZZI, J. VANDEWEGE, Inflation crises, human capital formation and growth, September 2004, 23 
p.  
 
04/261 F. DE GRAEVE, O. DE JONGHE, R. VANDER VENNET, Competition, transmission and bank pricing policies: 
Evidence from Belgian loan and deposit markets, September 2004, 59 p.  
 
04/262 B. VINDEVOGEL, D. VAN DEN POEL, G. WETS, Why promotion strategies based on market basket analysis do 
not work, October 2004, 19 p.  (forthcoming in Expert Systems with Applications, 2005) 
 
04/263 G. EVERAERT, L. POZZI, Bootstrap based bias correction for homogeneous dynamic panels, October 2004, 35 p.  
 
04/264 R. VANDER VENNET, O. DE JONGHE, L. BAELE, Bank risks and the business cycle, October 2004, 29 p. 
 
04/265 M. VANHOUCKE, Work continuity constraints in project scheduling, October 2004, 26 p. 
 
04/266 N. VAN DE SIJPE, G. RAYP, Measuring and Explaining Government Inefficiency in Developing Countries, October 
2004, 33 p. 
 
04/267 I. VERMEIR, P. VAN KENHOVE,  The Influence of the Need for Closure and Perceived Time Pressure on Search 
Effort for Price and Promotional Information in a Grocery Shopping Context, October 2004, 36 p. (published in 
Psychology & Marketing, 2005). 
 
04/268 I. VERMEIR, W. VERBEKE, Sustainable food consumption: Exploring the consumer attitude – behaviour gap, 
October 2004, 24 p. 
 
04/269 I. VERMEIR, M. GEUENS, Need for Closure and Leisure of Youngsters, October 2004, 17 p. 
 
04/270 I. VERMEIR, M. GEUENS, Need for Closure, Gender and Social Self-Esteem of youngsters, October 2004, 16 p. 
 
04/271 M. VANHOUCKE, K. VAN OSSELAER, Work Continuity in a Real-life Schedule: The Westerschelde Tunnel, 
October 2004, 12 p. 
04/272 M. VANHOUCKE, J. COELHO, L. V. TAVARES, D. DEBELS, On the morphological structure of a network, 
October 2004, 30 p.  
04/273 G. SARENS, I. DE BEELDE, Contemporary internal auditing practices: (new) roles and influencing variables. 
Evidence from extended case studies, October 2004, 33 p.  
04/274 G. MALENGIER, L. POZZI, Examining Ricardian Equivalence by estimating and bootstrapping a nonlinear dynamic 
panel model, November 2004, 30 p.  
04/275 T. DHONT, F. HEYLEN, Fiscal policy, employment and growth: Why is continental Europe lagging behind?, 
November 2004, 24 p.  
04/276 B. VINDEVOGEL, D. VAN DEN POEL, G. WETS, Dynamic cross-sales effects of price promotions: Empirical 
generalizations, November 2004, 21 p. 
 
04/277 J. CHRISTIAENS, P. WINDELS, S. VANSLEMBROUCK, Accounting and Management Reform in Local 
Authorities: A Tool for Evaluating Empirically the Outcomes, November 2004, 22 p. 
 
04/278 H.J. SAPIENZA, D. DE CLERCQ, W.R. SANDBERG, Antecedents of international and domestic learning effort, 
November 2004, 39 p. 
 
04/279 D. DE CLERCQ, D.P. DIMO, Explaining venture capital firms’ syndication behavior: A longitudinal study, November 
2004, 24 p. 
 
 
 
 
   FACULTEIT ECONOMIE EN BEDRIJFSKUNDE 
   HOVENIERSBERG 24 
   9000 GENT Tel. : 32 -  (0)9 – 264.34.61  
 Fax. : 32 -  (0)9 – 264.35.92  
 
 
 WORKING PAPER SERIES              15 
 
 
04/280 T. FASEUR, M. GEUENS, Different Positive Feelings Leading to Different Ad Evaluations: The Case of Cosiness, 
Excitement and Romance, November 2004, 17 p. 
 
04/281 B. BAESENS, T. VAN GESTEL, M. STEPANOVA, D. VAN DEN POEL, Neural Network Survival Analysis for 
Personal Loan Data, November 2004, 23 p. (Forthcoming in Journal of the Operational Research Society) 
 
04/282 B. LARIVIÈRE, D. VAN DEN POEL, Predicting Customer Retention and Profitability by Using Random Forests and 
Regression Forests Techniques, December 2004, 30 p. (Forthcoming in Expert Systems with Applications, 2005). 
 
05/283 R. I. LUTTENS, E. OOGHE, Is it fair to “make work pay”?, January 2005, 28 p. 
 
05/284 N. A. DENTCHEV, Integrating Corporate Social Responsibility In Business Models, January 2005, 29 p. 
 
05/285 K. FARRANT, G. PEERSMAN, Is the exchange rate a shock absorber or a source of shocks? New empirical 
evidence, January 2005, 26 p. (forthcoming Journal of Money Credit and Banking, 2005) 
 
05/286 G. PEERSMAN, The relative importance of symmetric and asymmetric shocks and the determination of the 
exchange rate, January 2005, 24 p. 
 
05/287 C. BEUSELINCK, M. DELOOF, S. MANIGART, Private Equity Investments and Disclosure Policy, January 2005, 44 
p.  
 
05/288 G. PEERSMAN, R. STRAUB, Technology Shocks and Robust Sign Restrictions in a Euro Area SVAR, January 
2005, 29 p.  
 
05/289 H.T.J. SMIT, W.A. VAN DEN BERG, W. DE MAESENEIRE, Acquisitions as a real options bidding game, January 
2005, 52 p.  
 
05/290 H.T.J. SMIT, W. DE MAESENEIRE, The role of investor capabilities in public-to-private transactions, January 2005, 
41 p.  
 
05/291 A. VEREECKE, S. MUYLLE, Performance Improvement Through Supply Chain Collaboration: Conventional Wisdom 
Versus Empirical Findings, February 2005, 33 p.  
 
05/292 A. PRINZIE, D. VAN DEN POEL, Incorporating sequential information into traditional classification models by using 
an element/position- sensitive SAM, February 2005, 32 p.  (Forthcoming in Decision Support Systems). 
 
05/293 D. DEBELS, M. VANHOUCKE, A Decomposition-Based Heuristic For The Resource-Constrained Project Scheduling 
Problem, February 2005, 25 p.  
 
05/294 D. DEBELS, M. VANHOUCKE, A Bi-Population Based Genetic Algorithm for the Resource-Constrained Project 
Scheduling Problem, February 2005, 10 p.  
 
05/295 W. VANDEKERCKHOVE, N.A. DENTCHEV Network perspective on stakeholder management: Facilitating entre-
preneurs in the discovery of opportunities, February 2005, 31 p.  
 
05/296 N. MORAY, B. CLARYSSE, Institutional Origin and Resource Endowments to Science-Based Entrepreneurial Firms: 
A European Exploration, February 2005, 39 p.  
 
05/297 B. CLARYSSE, M. KNOCKAERT, A. LOCKETT, How do Early Stage High Technology Investors Select Their 
Investments?, March 2005, 38 p.  
 
05/298 A. PRINZIE, D. VAN DEN POEL, Constrained optimization of data-mining problems to improve model performance: 
A direct-marketing application, March 2005, 32 p. (forthcoming in Expert Systems with Applications, 2005). 
 
05/299 B. LARIVIÈRE, D. VAN DEN POEL, Investigating the post-complaint period by means of survival analysis, March 
2005, 25 p.  
 
 
 
 
   FACULTEIT ECONOMIE EN BEDRIJFSKUNDE 
   HOVENIERSBERG 24 
   9000 GENT Tel. : 32 -  (0)9 – 264.34.61  
 Fax. : 32 -  (0)9 – 264.35.92  
 
 
 WORKING PAPER SERIES              16 
 
 
05/300 D. VANDAELE, P. GEMMEL, Impact of Support Services on End-users’ Satisfaction, March 2005, 28 p.  
 
05/301 T. DEMUYNCK, L. LAUWERS, Nash rationalizability of collective choice over lotteries, April 2005, 16 p. 
 
05/302 R. BRACKE, M. DE CLERCQ, Implementing Extended Producer Responsibility in Flemish Waste Policy: 
Evaluation of the Introduction of the Duty of Acceptance, April 2005, 24 p.  
 
05/303 Ph. DE MOOR, I. DE BEELDE, Environmental Auditing and the Role of the Accountancy Profession: A Literature 
Review, April 2005, 34 p.  
  
05/304 G. SARENS, I. DE BEELDE, Internal Auditor’s Perception about their Role in Risk Management Comparison 
between Belgian and US Companies, April 2005, 25 p.  
 
05/305 Ph. VAN CAUWENBERGHE, I. DE BEELDE, On the IASB Comprehensive Income Project, Neutrality of Display 
and the Case for Two EPS Numbers, May 2005, 29 p.  
 
05/306 P. EVERAERT, G. SARENS, Outsourcing bij Vlaamse Ondernemingen: een Exploratief Onderzoek, May 2005, 
36 p.  
 
05/307 S. CLAEYS, G. LANINE, K. SCHOORS, Bank Supervision Russian Style: Rules vs Enforcement and Tacit 
Objectives, May 2005, 60 p.  
 
05/308 A. SCHOLLAERT, D. VAN DE GAER, Boycotts, power politics or trust building: how to prevent conflict?, June 
2005, 34 p.  
 
05/309 B. MERLEVEDE, K. SCHOORS, How to Catch Foreign Fish? FDI and Privatisation in EU Accession Countries, 
June 2005, 32 p.  
 
05/310 A. HEIRMAN, B. CLARYSSE, The Imprinting Effect of Initial Resources and Market Strategy on the Early Growth 
Path of Start-Ups, June 2005, 38 p.  
 
05/311 A. MAES, G. POELS, J. GAILLY, R. PAEMELEIRE, Measuring User Beliefs and Attitudes towards Conceptual 
Models: A Factor and Structural Equation Model, June 2005, 25 p.  
 
05/312 S. VANDEVOORDE, M. VANHOUCKE, A Comparison of Different Project Duration Forecasting Methods using 
Earned Value Metrics, June 2005, 18 p.  
 
05/313 K. BAEYENS, T. VANACKER, S. MANIGART, Venture capitalists’ selection process: the case of biotechnololy 
proposals, June 2005, 23 p.  
 
05/314 M. VANHOUCKE, D. DEBELS, The discrete time/cost trade-off problem under various assumptions. Exact and 
heuristic procedures, June 2005, 32 p.  
 
05/315 G. POELS, A. MAES, F. GAILLY, R. PAEMELEIRE, User Attitudes towards Pattern-Based Enterprise 
Information Models: A Replicated Experiment with REA Diagrams, July 2005, 32 p.  
 
05/316 B. MAENHOUT, M. VANHOUCKE, An Electromagnetic Meta-Heuristic for the Nurse Scheduling Problem, July 
2005, 34 p.  
 
05/317 M. VANHOUCKE, S. VANDEVOORDE, A simulation and evaluation of earned value metrics to forecast the 
project duration, July 2005, 30 p. 
 
05/318 I. VERMEIR, M. GEUENS, Need for Closure and Youngsters’ Leisure Time Preferences, July 2005, 25 p. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   FACULTEIT ECONOMIE EN BEDRIJFSKUNDE 
   HOVENIERSBERG 24 
   9000 GENT Tel. : 32 -  (0)9 – 264.34.61  
 Fax. : 32 -  (0)9 – 264.35.92  
 
 
 WORKING PAPER SERIES              17 
 
 
05/319 D. VANTOMME, M. GEUENS, S. DEWITTE, How to Portray Men and Women in Advertisements? Explicit and 
Implicit Evaluations of Ads Depicting Different Gender Roles, July 2005, 34 p. 
 
05/320 B. WEIJTERS, M. GEUENS, Evaluation of age-related labels by senior citizens, July 2005, 27 p.  
 
05/321 S. STEENHAUT, P. VANKENHOVE, An Empirical Investigation of the Relationships among a Consumer’s 
Personal Values, Ethical Ideology and Ethical Beliefs, July 2005, 36 p. 
 
05/322 V. VANSTEEGER, The current state of accounting harmonization: impediments to and benefits from 
harmonization, August 2005, 30 p. 
 
05/323 G. POELS, F. GAILLY, A. MAES, R. PAEMELEIRE, Object Class or Association Class? Testing the User Effect 
on Cardinality Interpretation, August 2005, 14 p. 
 
05/324 G. BUCKINX, G. VERSTRAETEN, D. VAN DEN POEL, Predicting Customer Loyalty Using The Internal 
Transactional Database, August 2005, 33 p. 
 
05/325 M. KNOCKAERT, A. LOCKETT, B. CLARYSSE, M. WRIGHT, Do human capital and fund characteristics drive 
follow-up behaviour of early stage high tech VCs?, August 2005, 27 p. 
 
05/326 H. DEWITTE, E. VERHOFSTADT, E. OMEY, Testing Karasek’s learning- and strain hypothesis on young workers 
in their first job, August 2005, 27 p. 
 
05/327 A. KARAS, K. SCHOORS, Heracles or Sisyphus? Finding, cleaning and reconstructing a database of Russian 
banks, September 2005, 26 p. 
 
05/328 M. BUELENS, D. BOUCKENOOGHE, D. DE CLERCQ, A. WILLEM, An Assessment of Validity in Small 
Business and Entrepreneurship Research, September 2005, 33 p. 
 
05/329 G. LANINE, R. VANDER VENNET, Failure prediction in the Russian bank sector with logit and trait recognition 
models, August 2005, 31 p. 
 
05/330 W. BUCKINX, D. VAN DEN POEL, Assessing and exploiting the profit function by modeling the net impact of 
targeted marketing, September 2005, 30 p. 
 
05/331 J. CHRISTIAENS, P. WINDELS, Management Reform in Flemish Local Authorities: Testing the Institutional 
Framework, September 2005, 24 p. 
 
05/332 W. BRUGGEMAN, P. EVERAERT, S.R. ANDERSON, Y. LEVANT, Modeling Logistics Costs using Time-Driven 
ABC: A Case in a Distribution Company, September 2005, 47 p. 
 
05/333 E. LABRO, M. VANHOUCKE, A simulation analysis of interactions between errors in costing system design, 
September 2005, 50 p. 
 
05/334 L. POZZI, Income uncertainty and aggregate consumption, October 2005, 47 p. 
 
 
 
